FREDRIC JAMESON
The theory of mass culture--or mass audience culture, commercial cultur culture, the culture industry, as it is variously known--has always tended to defi against so-called high culture without reflecting on the objective status of this As so often, positions in this field reduce themselves to two mirror-ima essentially staged in terms of value. Thus the familiar motif of elitism argues for of mass culture on the grounds of the sheer numbers of people exposed to it; th high or hermetic culture is then stigmatized as a status hobby of small g intellectuals. As its anti-intellectual thrust suggests, this essentially negative po little theoretical content but clearly responds to a deeply rooted conviction radicalism and articulates a widely based sense that high culture is an est phenomenon, irredeemably tainted by its association with institutions, in partic the university. The value invoked is therefore a social one: it would be pref with tv programs, The Godfather, orJaws, rather than with Wallace Stevens or H because the former clearly speak a cultural language meaningful to far wider st population than what is socially represented by intellectuals. Radicals are h intellectuals, so that this position has suspicious overtones of the guilt trip; me overlooks the anti-social and critical, negative (although generally not re stance of much of the most important forms of modem art; finally, it offers no reading even those cultural objects it valorizes and has had little of interest their content.
This position is then reversed in the theory of culture worked out by the Frankfurt School; as is appropriate for this exact antithesis of the radical position, the work of Adomo, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and others is an intensely theoretical one and provides a working methodology for the close analysis of precisely those products of the culture industry which it stigmatizes and which the radical view exalted. Briefly, this view can be characterized as the extension and application of Marxist theories of commodity reification to the works of mass culture. The theory of reification (here strongly overlaid with Max Weber's analysis of rationalization) describes the way in which, under capitalism, the older traditional forms of human activity are instrumentally reorganized and "taylorized," analytically fragmented and reconstructed according to various rational models of efficiency, and essentially restructured along the lines of a differentiation between means and ends. But this is a paradoxical idea: it cannot be properly appreciated until it is understood to what degree the means/ends split effectively brackets or suspends ends themselves, hence the strategic value of the Frankfurt School term "instrumentalization" which usefully foregrounds the organization of the means themselves over against any particular end or value which is assigned to their practice. In traditional activity, in other words, the value of the activity is immanent to it, and qualitatively distinct from other ends or values articulated in other for kinds of work in such commun instance, the familiar Aristotelia poeisis (material, formal, efficien to agriculture or war which had divine--basis. It is only with th Capital designates as the fundam labor can be separated out from activity (mining as opposed to manufacture), and all universally tive, that is, under the universal the various forms of human a effectively been bracketted or su free to be ruthlessly reorganized
The force of the application of definition of art by traditional without an end," that is, as a g purpose or end in the "real wo generally. This traditional definit that fall flat or home movies or of mass and high culture alike preoccupations just as complet Wings of the Dove or hear a Be At this point, however, the c structural and historical differentiation into what was conceived as the universal description of the aesthetic experience as such and in whatever form. The concept of t commodity cuts across the phenomenon of reification--described above in terms of activity or production-from a different angle, that of consumption. In a world in whi everything, including labor power, has become a commodity, ends remain no le undifferentiated than in the production schema-they are all rigorously quantified, a have become abstractly comparable through the medium of money, their respective price or wage-yet we can now phrase their instrumentalization, their reorganization along t means/ends split, in a new way by saying that by its transformation into a commodity a thing, of whatever type, has been reduced to a means for its own consumption. It no longe has any qualitative value in itself, but only insofar as it can be "used": the various forms o activity lose their immanent intrinsic satisfactions as activity and become means to an end
The objects of the commodity world of capitalism also shed their independent "being" and intrinsic qualities and come to be so many instruments of commodity satisfaction: th familiar example is that of tourism-the American tourist no longer lets the landscape "be i its being" as Heidegger would have said, but takes a snapshot of it, thereby graphical transforming space into its own material image. aesthetics, if only because it implies that everything in consumer society has taken on aesthetic dimension. The force of the Adorno-Horkheimer analysis of the culture indu however, lies in its demonstration of the unexpected and imperceptible introduc commodity structure into the very form and content of the work of art itself. Yet th something like the ultimate squaring of the circle, the triumph of instrumentalization that "finality without an end" which is art itself, the steady conquest and colonization o ultimate realm of non-practicality, of sheer play and anti-use, by the logic of the wor means and ends. But how can the sheer materiality of a poetic sentence be "used" sense? And while it is clear how we can buy the idea of an automobile or smoke for the libidinal image of actors, writers, and models with cigarettes in their hands, it is muc clear how a narrative could be "consumed" for the benefit of its own idea.
In its simplest form, this view of instrumentalized culture-and it is implicit in t aesthetics of the Tel Quel group as well as in that of the Frankfurt School--suggests that t reading process is itself restructured along a means/ends differentiation. It is instructive here to juxtapose Auerbach's discussion of the Odyssey in Mimesis, and his description the way in which at every point the poem is as it were vertical to itself, self-contained, e verse paragraph and tableau somehow timeless and immanent, bereft of any necessary
indispensible links with what precedes it and what follows; in this light it becomes possibl to appreciate the strangeness, the historical un-naturality (in a Brechtian sense) of contemporary books which, like detective stories, you read "for the ending"--the bulk of the pages becoming sheer devalued means to an end--in this case, the "solution"--which itself utterly insignificant insofar as we are not thereby in the real world and by the latter practical standards the identity of an imaginary murderer is supremely trivial.
The detective story is to be sure an extremely specialized form: still, the essentia commodification of which it may serve as an emblem can be detected everywhere in t sub-genres of contemporary commercial art, in the way in which the materialization of th or that sector or zone of such forms comes to constitute an end and a consumption satisfaction around which the rest of the work is then "degraded" to the status of sh means. Thus, in the older adventure tale, not only does the denouement (victory of hero o villains? discovery of the treasure, rescue of the heroine or the imprisoned comrades, foil of a monstrous plot, or arrival in time to reveal an urgent message or a secret) stand as th reified end in view of which the rest of the narrative is consumed, this reifying structure al reaches down into the very page-by-page detail of the book's composition. Each chapt recapitulates a smaller consumption process in its own right, ending with the frozen imag of a new and catastrophic reversal of the situation, constructing the smaller gratifications a flat character who actualizes his single potentiality (the "choleric" Ned Land fina exploding in anger), organizing its sentences into paragraphs each of which is a sub-plot in its own right, or around the ob tableau, the whole tempo of su illustrations which, either befor to transform the transparent f objects we can consume.
Yet this is still a relatively pri and more interesting is the w produce a quasi-material "fee intermittently realized by it: th rhythms of the earth or of gr so many commodities towar means, their essential materiali that accompanies their screen consumable feeling tone is a manifestation of the kind of " about the way the contempor sonata form itself becomes an tune or melody.
It will be clear, then, that I c structure of mass culture of th way of looking at the same ph exhausted. On the contrary, such descriptions, let alone to features besides commodity re What is unsatisfactory about apparatus, but rather the p valorization of traditional mo subversive, "autonomous" ae Marcuse's The Aesthetic Dim assessment of a Schoenberg's been omitted from the later ju historicity, and in particular, t But if this is so, then the grea Becke'tt, or even Brecht himse which to measure the "degrad undeveloped tendencies in rec "new music" of the type of L literary texts like those of P mass cultures.
For all these reasons, it seems to me that we must rethink the opposition high culture/mass culture in such a way that the emphasis on evaluation to which it has traditionally given rise, and which-however the binary system of value operates (ma culture is popular and thus more authentic than high culture, high culture is autonomous and therefore utterly incomparable to a degraded mass culture)--tends to function in some timeless realm of absolute aesthetic judgment, is replaced by a genuinely historical a dialectical approach to these phenomena. Such an approach demands that we read high and mass culture as objectively related and dialectically interdependent phenomena, as tw The task of defining this new area of study would then initially involve making inventory of other such problematic themes or phenomena in terms of which the interrelationship of mass culture and modernism can usefully be explored, something it is too early to do here. At this point, I will merely note one further such theme, which has seemed to me to be of the greatest significance in specifying the antithetical form reactions of modernism and mass culture to their common social situation, and that is the notion of repetition. This concept, which in its modem form we own to Kierkegaard, known rich and interesting new elaborations in recent post-structuralism: for Jea Baudrillard, for example, the repetitive structure of what he calls the simulacrum (that is the reproduction of "copies" which have no original) characterizes the commodity production of consumer capitalism and marks our object world with an unreality and a fre floating absence of "the referent" (e.g., the place hitherto taken by nature, by raw materi and primary production, or by the "originals" of artisanal production or handicraft) utter unlike anything experienced in any earlier social formation.
If this is the case, then we would expect repetition to constitute yet another feature o the contradictory situation of contemporary aesthetic production to which both modernism and mass culture in one way or another cannot but react. This is in fact the case, and on ideologies of the various discip cultural issues to that ghettoizin "sociology of culture"--it is also the most fundamental ideologi "culture"-reduced to plays and most trivial and non-serious acti even the vocation of the esthete the 1950s and of his successor, t content and expressed (general tion and the repudiation of the p then, to be sure, as thoroughly r work of the sociologists of m accounting for the resistance a anything which smacks of the economic, the historical context-which it was the function of the aesthetic vocation to deny or to mask out in the first place.
What we must ask the sociologists of manipulation, however, is whether they really inhabit the same world we do. Speaking for at least a few, I will say that culture, far from being an occasional matter of the reading of a monthly good book or a trip to the drive-in, seems to me the very element of consumer society itself; no society has ever been saturated with signs and messages like this one. If we follow Debord's argument about the omnipresence and the omnipotence of the image in consumer capitalism today, then if anything the priorities of the real become reversed, and everything is mediated by culture, to the point where even the political and the ideological "levels" have initially to be disentangled from their primary mode of representation which is cultural. Howard Jarvis, Carter, even Castro, the Red Brigade, Vorster, the Communist "penetration" of Africa, the war in Vietnam, strikes, inflation itself-all are images, all come before us with the immediacy of cultural representations of which one can be fairly certain that they are by a long shot not historical reality itself. If we want to go on believing in categories like social class, then we are going to have to dig for them in the insubstantial bottomless realm of cultural and collective fantasy. Even ideology has in our society lost its clarity as prejudice, false consciousness, readily identifiable opinion: our racism gets all mixed up with clean-cut black actors on tv and in commercials, our sexism has to make a detour through new stereotypes of the "women's libber" on the network series. After that, if one wants to stress the primacy of the political, so be it: until the omnipresence of culture in this society is even dimly sensed, realistic conceptions of the nature and function of political praxis today can scarcely be framed.
It is true that manipulation theory sometimes finds a special place in its scheme for those rare cultural objects which can be said to have overt political and social content: thus, 60s protest songs, The Salt of the Earth, Clancey Segal's novels or Sol Yurick's, chicano murals, and the San Francisco Mime Troop. This is not the place to raise the complicated problem of political art today, except to say that our business as culture critics requires us to raise it, and to rethink what are still essentially 30s categories in some new and more satisfactory contemporary way. But the problem of political art-and we have nothing worth saying about it if we do not realize that it is a problem, rather than a choice or a ready- The only authentic cultural production today has seemed to be that which can draw the collective experience of marginal pockets of the social life of the world system: b literature and blues, British working-class rock, women's literature, gay literat roman quebecois, the literature of the Third World; and this production is possible on the degree to which these forms of collective life or collective solidarity have not ye fully penetrated by the market and by the commodity system. This is not neces negative prognosis, unless you believe in an increasingly windless and all-embraci system; what shatters such a system-it has unquestionably been falling into p around us since the development of industrial capitalism-is however very prec collective praxis or, to pronounce its traditional and unmentionable name, class st Yet the relationship between class struggle and cultural production is not an im one; you do not reinvent an access onto political art and authentic cultural produc studding your individual artistic discourse with class and political signals. Rathe struggle, and the slow and intermittent development of genuine class consciousn themselves the process whereby a new and organic group constitutes itself, wher collective breaks through the reified atomization (Sartre calls it the seriality) of capit social life. At that point, to say that the group exists and that it generates its own sp cultural life and expression, are one and the same. This is, if you like, the third term m from my initial picture of the fate of the aesthetic and the cultural under capitalism useful purpose is served by speculation on the forms such a third and authentic cultural language might take in situations which do not yet exist. As for the artists, fo too "the owl of Minerva takes its flight at dusk," for them too, as with Lenin in April, of historical inevitability is always after the fact, and they cannot be told any more th rest of us what is historically possible until after it has been tried.
This said, we can now return to the question of mass culture and manipulat Manipulation theory implies a psychology, but this is all very well and good: Brecht t us that under the right circum liked (Mann ist Mann), only he in or more than on the techniques concept, of manipulation can b repression. The Freudian mechani charged memory, guilty or threa risks emerging into the subjec minate, it has specific content, a that content which expresses itse displacement, substitution, or w But of course the classical Fre joke) was that of the symbolic fu indirection whereby desire coul a to be sure purely symbolic sati however--Norman Holland's Th more useful for our present prob can possibly be said to "manipula work of art must be described incompatible features of aesth function, but on the other the against the frightening and pote wish-material--be somehow har structure. Hence Holland's sugg manage this raw material of the the concept of a management of wish-fulfillment together within in a kind of psychic compromi content within careful symbo intolerable, unrealizable, proper can again be laid to rest.
This model seems to me to per manipulation, diversion, degradat the media. In particular it allows false consciousness, but rather and fantasies which must then order subsequently to be "man present essay suggest that such though we will not here be able t argue that both mass culture and word, as the older social realisms than in the latter. I  will  now  dem  recent commer readings I will propose are at least consistent with my earlier remarks about the volatilization of the primary text in mass culture by repetition, to the degree of which they are differential, "intertextually" comparative decodings of each of these filmic messages.
In the case ofJaws, however, the version or variant against which we will read the film is not the shoddy and disappointing sequel, but rather the bestselling novel from which the film--one of the most successful box office attractions in movie history-was adapted. We will see that the adaptation involved significant changes in the original narrative; our attention to such strategic alterations may indeed arouse some initial suspicion of the official or "manifest" content preseryed in both these texts, and on which most of the discussion ofJaws has tended to focus. Thus critics from Gore Vidal and Pravda all the way to Stephen Heath have tended to emphasize the problem of the shark itself and what it "represents": such speculation ranges from the psychoanalytic to historic anxieties about the Other that menaces American society-whether it be the Communist conspiracy or the Third World-and even to internal fears about the unreality of daily life in American today, and in particular the haunting and unmentionable persistence of the organic--of birth, copulation, and death-which the cellophane society of consumer capitalism desperately recontains in hospitals and old age homes, and sanitizes by means of a whole strategy of linguistic euphemisms which enlarge the older, purely sexual ones: on this view, the Nantucket beaches "represent" consumer society itself, with its glossy and commodified images of gratification, and its scandalous and fragile, ever suppressed, sense of its own possible mortality. Now none of these readings can be said to be wrong or aberrant, but their very multiplicity suggests that the vocation of the symbol--the killer shark-lies less in any single message or meaning than in its very capacity to absorb and organize all of these quite distinct anxieties together. As a symbolic vehicle, then, the shark must be understood in terms of its essentially polysemous function rather than any particular content attributable to it by this or that spectator. Yet it is precisely this polysemousness which is profoundly ideological, insofar as it allows essentially social and historical anxieties to be folded back into apparently "natural" ones, to be both expressed and recontained in what looks like a conflict with other forms of biological existence.
Interpretive emphasis on the shark, indeed, tends to drive all these quite varied readings in the direction of myth criticism, where the shark is naturally enough taken to be the most recent embodiment of Leviathan, so that the struggle with it effortlessly folds back into one of the fundamental paradigms or archetypes of Professor Frye's storehouse of myth. To rewrite the film in these terms is thus to emphasize what I will shortly call its Utopian dimension, that is, its ritual celebration of the renewal of the social order and its salvation, not merely from divine wrath, but also from unworthy leadership.
But to put it this way is to begin to shift our attention from the shark itself to the emergence of the hero-or heroes--whose mythic task it is to rid the civilized world of the archetypal monster. This is, however, precisely the issue-the nature and the specification of the "mythic" hero--about which the discrepancies between the film and the novel have something instructive to tell us. For the novel involves an undisguised expression of class conflict in the tension between the island cop and the high-society oceanographer, who used to summer in Easthampton and ends up sleeping with Brody's wife: Hooper is indeed a much more important figure in the novel than in the film, while by the same token the novel assigns Quint a very minor role most dramatic surprise the nove discovery that in the book Hoo romantic fascination with death how the American reading pu resonance of this element of the to be a more European motif-of the islander and the yankee over the decadent playboy challenger-are surely unmistakable, as is the systematic elimination and suppression of all such class overtones from the film itself.
The latter therefore provides us with a striking illustration of a whole work of displacement by which the written narrative of an essentially class fantasy has been transformed, in the Hollywood product, into something quite different, which it now remains to characterize. Gone is the whole decadent and aristocratic brooding over death, along with the erotic rivalry in which class antagonisms were dramatized; the Hooper of the film is nothing but a technocratic whiz-kid, no tragic hero but instead a good-natured creature of grants and foundations and scientific know-how. But Brody has also undergone an important modification: he is no longer the small-town island boy married to a girl from a socially prominent summer family; rather, he has been transformed into a retired cop from New York City, relocating on Nantucket in an effort to flee the hassle of urban crime, race war, and ghettoization. The figure of Brody now therefore introduces overtones and connotations of law-and-order, rather than of yankee shrewdness, and functions as a tvpolice-show hero transposed into this apparently more sheltered but in reality equally contradictory milieu which is the great American summer vacation.
I will therefore suggest that in the film the socially resonant conflict between these two characters has for some reason that remains to be formulated been transformed into a vision of their ultimate partnership, and joint triumph over Leviathan. This is clearly the moment to come to Quint, whose enlarged role in the film thereby becomes strategic. The mythcritical option for reading this figure must at once be noted: it is indeed tempting to see Quint as the end term of the three-fold figure of the ages of man into which the team of shark-hunters is so obviously articulated, Hooper and Brody then standing as youth and maturity over against Quint's authority as an elder. But such a reading leaves the basic interpretive problem intact: what can be the allegorical meaning of a ritual in which the elder figure follows the intertextual paradigm of Melville's Ahab to destruction while the other two paddle back in triumph on the wreckage of his vessel? Or, to formulate it in different way, why is the Ishmael survivor-figure split into the two survivors of the film (and credited with the triumphant destruction of the monster in the bargain)?
Quint's determinations in the film seem to be of two kinds: first, unlike the bureaucracies of law enforcement and science-&-technology (Brody and Hooper), but also in distinction to the corrupt island Mayor with his tourist investments and big business interests, Quint is defined as the locus of old-fashioned private enterprise, of the individual entrepreneurship not merely of small business, but also of local business-hence the insistence on his salty Down-East typicality. Meanwhile-but this feature is also a new addition to the very schematic treatment of the figure of Quint in the novel-he also strongly associates himself with a now distant American past by way of his otherwise gratuitous reminiscences about World War II and the campaign in the Pacific. We are thus authorized to read the death of Quint in the film as the two-fold symbolic destruction of an we w consciousness, so that the works of mass culture, even if their function lies in the legitimation of the existing order--or some worse one--cannot do their job without deflecting in the latter's service the deepest and most fundamental hopes and fantasies of the collectivity, to which they can therefore, no matter in how distorted a fashion, be found to have given voice.
We therefore need a method capable of doing justice to both the ideological and the Utopian or transcendent functions of mass culture simultaneously. Nothing less will do, as the suppression of either of these terms may testify: we have already commented on the sterility of the older kind of ideological analysis, which, ignoring the Utopian components of mass culture, ends up with the emp degraded status. But it is equally o would celebrate Utopian impulses ideological vocation of mass culturemost academic and aestheticizing an the same time that it abstracts them from their concrete social and historical situation.
The two parts of The Godfather have seemed to me to offer a virtual textbook illustration of these propositions; for one thing, recapitulating the whole generic tradition of the gangster film, it reinvents a certain "myth" of the Mafia in such a way as to allow us t see that ideology is not necessarily a matter of false consciousness, or of the incorrect o distorted representation of historical "fact," but can rather be quite consistent with a "realistic" faithfulness to the latter. To be sure, historical inaccuracy (as, e.g., when the 50s are telescoped into the 60s and 70s in the narrative of Hoffa's career in FIS.T. ) can ofte provide a suggestive lead towards ideological function: not because there is any scientifi virtue in the facts themselves, but rather as a symptom of a resistance of the "logic of the content," of the substance of historicity in question, to the narrative and ideologica paradigm into which it has been thereby forcibly assimilated.
The Godfather, however, obviously works in and is a permutation of a generic convention; one could write a history of the changing social and ideological functions o this convention, showing how analogous motifs are called upon in distinct historical situations to emit strategically distinct yet symbolically intelligible messages. Thus th gangsters of the classical 30s films (Robinson, Cagney, etc.) were dramatized as psychopaths, sick loners striking out against a society essentially made up of wholesom people (the archetypal democratic "common man" of New Deal populism). The post-war gangsters of the Bogart era remain loners in this sense but have unexpectedly become invested with tragic pathos in such a way as to express the confusion of veterans returning from World War II, struggling with the unsympathetic rigidity of institutions, and ultimatel crushed by a petty and vindictive social order.
The Mafia material was drawn on and alluded to in these earlier versions of the gangster paradigm, but did not emerge as such until the late 50s and the early 60s: this very distinctive narrative content-a kind of saga or family material analogous to that of th medieval chansons de geste, with its recurrent episodes and legendary figures returnin again and again in different perspectives and contexts--can at once be structurally differentiated from the older paradigms by its collective nature: in this, reflecting a evolution towards organizational themes and team narratives which studies like Will Wright's Sixguns and Society have shown to be significant developments in the other subgenres of mass culture (the western, the caper film, etc.) during the 60s.
Such an evolution, however, suggests a global transformation of post-war America social life and a global transformation of the potential logic of its narrative content withou yet specifying the ideological function of the Mafia paradigm itself. Yet this is surely not ver difficult to identify. When indeed we reflect on an organized conspiracy against the public, one which reaches into every comrner of our daily lives and our political structures t exercise a wanton ecocidal and genocidal violence at the behest of distant decision-make and in the name of an abstract conception of profit--surely it is not about the Mafia, but rather about American business itself that we are thinking, American capitalism in its most systematized and computerized, dehumanized, "multinational" and corporate form. Wh kind of crime, said Brecht, is the robbing of a bank, compared to the founding of a bank? Ye 
